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Article 5

GROWING UNION POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
by David McCord Wright*
To understand union power we must first understand unions. After all
people would not have been joining unions all these years purely as the result of force and without some reason. "Why unions?" we must ask before
discussing whether they can be too strong. Unions, as I see it, came into being
for the following purposes: To improve working conditions; to limit arbitrary
and unfair discrimination between individuals on the job; to give more "security"; to give "companionship"; to give "more." All these are prima fade
good things. Why then speak of "too much" union power?
Unfortunately it is a fact that many good principles and good aims, pushed
too far, become evils. The Greeks had an idea that truth and justice did not
remain unalterably with any one side or cause, but moved from one group to
another as certain qualities became "excessive." My feeling is that this is what
has happened with unions. But what I think is not important. What is important is whether the reasoning and the facts on which I base my opinion
are correct. Let us examine them.
I
We may begin with the union aim of "more" - not because it is the
only aim, but because it is the one we hear most about, and because it makes
a convenient starting point for opening out the whole problem. Professor
Meltzer has just said that the proportion going to "labor" and "management"
has not greatly changed since unions became strong. I have read this too and
I teach it to my students, albeit with some misgivings. For I am constitutionally allergic to sweepingly simple statistical generalizations, especially when they
depend as much on definitions as this one does. However, leaving such doubts
aside - even though, on balance, the proportion going to aggregate real wages
may not be changing much - this is far from being the same thing as saying
that unions have had no influence on the economy, or that individual unions
have not made great economic gains for their particulargroup of members. The
questions, then, to ask are: Has the influence, on balance, been good? Has
the gain for the members, still having jobs, been a net gain for society, or has
it been at the expense of other groups?
Simple arithmetic, assuming the facts to be as given, will show that a
great part of the proportional gains of strong unions must have been at the
"expense" of other workers. For if the proportion going to the whole group
has not grown and the proportion going to a part of the working group has
grown, it must have grown at the proportional "expense" of other members
of the group. Whether this is good or bad depends upon a number of considerations. It is clear, however, that the race among unions (and union leaders)
to maintain or achieve differential position greatly increases the inflationary bias
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of the movement as a whole. But let us first discuss inflation as an aggregate
problem and then come back to particular groups.
One usually hears it said that money wage increases are not inflationary
and are "all right" (not necessarily the same thing) if they do not exceed
gains in "productivity." But the question here is, whose productivity? As Professor Rees remarks, "It is now generally well realized that output per manhour does not necessarily reflect the contribution of production workers to
changes in efficiency. It can rise because production workers work harder or
are more skilled. However, it can also rise because more capital or more nonproduction workers are used per production worker . . . improved quality
of purchased materials . . . technical change."1 And Dr. Myers remarks the
"productivity index may move upward" (for the reasons given by Rees) "even
though physical labor effort and job responsibility may be lower as a consequence of improved technology . . . It is important to emphasize that the
measure of productivity involves no ethical connotation of what workers or
employees generally 'contribute' to output and hence what they 'should' receive in wages or salaries." 2 Finally, Dr. Rees remarks that "after 1919 output per unit of capital" has risen.3 As I see it, the inflationary pressure of the
union demand for higher money wages has been contained, as much as it has
been, largely through the ingenuity of management and inventors in devising
ever more ingenious ways of using more and more productive capital per
worker.
I have been tempted to paraphrase the well-known union song as follows:
Management Song
They've been given many millions that they never thought to earn
But without our care and risking there would be no wheels to turn.
Seriously speaking our society takes so completely for granted the activities
of the conceiving mind, the risk bearer, and the saver, that it is in danger not
merely of forgetting but also of stifling them. However let us for the moment
get on with the problem of aggregate inflation.
Without getting into what has become a sort of numbers game, I am
obliged to say that I feel union action in many key industries has pushed money
wages far ahead of productivity. Merely as a sample let me give the following from data by T. A. Anderson.4 In the tobacco industry between first quarter
1955 and first quarter 1959 wages increased 23.0, prices 8.7 but "productivity"
30.2. In iron and steel, however, during the same period, wages increased
34.8, prices 26.5, but the productivity only 11.3. In electrical machinery, wages
increased 19.5, prices 20.7, and productivity not at all. The whole table is
recommended.
One can, of course, alter base periods, shift classifications and so on. Since
this part of the problem has been so exhaustively discussed, let us proceed to
develop the implications for economic activity of the tendency for money wages
1
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in many key industries to rise faster than productivity, which, I submit, the
balance of the evidence clearly shows.
In my symposium, The Impact of the Labor Union,5 you will find the
following jingle:
We all or nearly all consent
If wages rise by ten per cent
It puts a choice before the nation
Of unemployment or inflation.
The analysis here does not imply any "iron law" of real wages but it does
mean that aggregate money wages cannot, on the average, greatly exceed productivity growth without there being trouble. Most people can see the inflation side of the problem, but what about the unemployment? Surely, if only
the banks are allowed to create enough money, there will be enough "demand," and that will be that. Thus any unemployment will be blamed on tight
money and high interest.
Analyses of this sort usually have behind them a picture of an economic
system in which all production is rigidly, immediately, and mechanically tied
to consumption. Only if consumption rises will investment be undertaken. And
if it rises, investment will, it is thought, be undertaken. "Demand," reversing
orthodox theory, "creates its own supply."
Unfortunately this picture is quite wrong. A key section of our economic
system is found in investment output - the inducement of which is frequently
not immediate consumption but long range profit perspective: the businessman's forecast of the relative movements of cost and prices. There cannot be
full employment in our society unless, on balance, a social atmosphere and
cost-price outlook exist which induce a number of concerns to make long-range
commitments of this sort. And, even if we think only of immediate consumption industries, brewing, for example, and assume that beer sales are rising,
employment will not increase if no perspective of net profit, adequate to risk,
can be seen.6 I do not, of course, ascribe to the crude fallacy that mere high
prices due to wage gains in excess of productivity will cause inflation. But
what the cost-price maladjustment does do is to put the monetary authority
in the position either of underwriting the inflationary wage increase - and
hence having inflation - or else allowing unemployment.
Unfortunately, however, the situation is not even as simple as that, or as
given in my jingle. The last line indeed could be changed to read "unemployment and inflation." How so? The answer lies in the forecast-of-profit analysis
of the last paragraph. The analysis there given shows how inflation and unemployment can exist at the same time, and also how too rapid a rate of wage
increases, even when accompanied by soft money, can cause depression and unemployment. The investor - on whom employment in large part depends is not merely concerned with present sales. He is concerned with the perspective
of profit. He is bound to allow for the fact that the inflation may come to
an end, or that at any rate it won't be as fast as the cost increases. He is bound
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to have some concept of normal value or price and to feel that departures
from it involve increasing risk. Thus present inflation combined with uncertainty over the future will not necessarily give full employment. On the contrary, it may turn the boom into a smash.7 We may see some such development before too long. Nor, in my opinion, is it sound to lay the blame merely on "administered" prices. People who use this slogan are too often thinking
in terms of a stationary society in which a consumer goods market needs to
be "cleared" of inventory already produced. But such an analysis cannot be
applied, literally, to long range investment plans. There, as stated, it is the
long run perspective of profit that counts. And it is unreasonable to suppose
that when investors see a trend of money wages going higher and higher in
excess of productivity, they will be induced to risk their funds and employ labor
if prices simultaneously are to be forced down.
Let us sum up the problem of aggregate wages, investment, inflation, and
employment. Money wage increases do not need to cause higher prices if productivity is increasing sufficiently. But wage increases in excess of productivity
make it necessary to raise prices if there is to be a sufficient inducement to
invest for full employment. If not, employment will drop. "Demand for commodities is not demand for labor," as even Lord Keynes once repeated.' If
the businessman sees no margin of profit in prospect, and instead sees loss
ahead, he will tend to let inventory decline and even go out of business. When
we consider long-range investment plans, the situation gets even worse. The
retailer may manage somehow for a while, but if the long-range investor feels
that the inflationary cost price situation is temporary he may not invest even
if there is inflation; by a multiplier process unemployment will spread.
II
Let us shift now from aggregate wages to particular work groups. Is it
always bad for wages in one industry to go up faster than "productivity"?
Contrariwise, is it always bad for wages in some industries to lag behind wages
in others? Are we to set up an iron-clad universal standard of "equal pay
for equal work," and is the standard always to be that of the highest paying
industry of the moment? I do not see how one can possibly discuss these questions without discussing the operation of the pricing system. For, even if one
does not believe in the pricing system and wants to set up a substitute, it is
still important to know the exact problem for which one is proposing an alternative.
I find it difficult to exaggerate the amount of damage done to our understanding of the pricing mechanism by the use of equilibrium models. For,
after all, growth comes through change and causes change and, as we shall
see more and more in the course of this paper, the real test of any social system
is how it meets this problem of necessary adjustment to change - not just how
it looks when at rest. Now how does the pricing system adjust the labor market
and the wage problem to change? The primary agent is the push and pull of
7 Id. at 195-6.
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differential reward. Suppose a new industry appears, giving rise to a great
demand for the development of a particular area. Profit prospects will go up
for that area and, if labor is scarce, wages will rise there also. The effect, under the pricing system, will be to draw labor into the new field - whereupon,
other things being equal, wages and prices are likely to revert to more nearly their "normal" levels. Scarcities then, temporary or permanent, may well
raise the money wages of a particular group well above what has been thought
of as its "productivity." To be sure, the word "productivity" has so many meanings it can cover this case too, but I have been trying to convey the low-brow
approach to the problem.
But now let us ask: Should the wages of all similar workers all over the
system be raised to match the special wage created by a local shortage- (and
often particularly high to cover inconveniences of moving)? The proposition
scarcely makes sense. To be sure, if the local scarcity lasts, and is large enough,
it will pull up the level of wages in that line throughout the system. And in
fact this is the ultimate source of real wage increases anyhow. But shall equal
pay for equal work be used as a sanction for immediate general dislocation?
Reversing the problem, if an industry is declining and cannot afford to
pay the higher wages created by industrial progress should they be forced up
anyhow? This will of course accelerate the closing of the industry and create
immediate unemployment, and a need to transfer, when the process would
otherwise have been more gradual and yielded jobs for the less enterprising for
some years. Important conflicts of value standards and group interest are obviously possible here.
The pricing system is far from perfect, as we all well know; but it does
have one ethical feature that should be noticed: It considers the interest of
the whole labor force - not just that of one group. Suppose, again, a new
industry to develop in a backward area where wages are low. Under the pricing system wages would probably, for a while, remain low, industrial expansion
could continue, other industries could be brought in, and then, as the ratio of
capital to labor rose, wages would rise. They would rise in a manner to consider the whole group. Suppose, on the other hand, the new industry is immediately organized on an "equal pay" basis, a wage level is imposed appropriate to areas of labor scarcity elsewhere, and further expansion is cut off.
The result would be to create relative affluence for one small group of workers
leaving the rest of the region in poverty. The ardent unionist from a high wage
area, proselytizing immediate wage increases in an undeveloped region, may
be sincere in his own mind. But considered objectively, his role may be one
of rather doubtful altruism. I am sorry to have to bring up these points but
they happen to be true, and a part of the general picture that public interest
cannot ignore.
One final point must be made. We hear a lot today about technological
unemployment, automation and so on. Much of the discussion reads as if technological changes were quite spontaneous - as if they came down from the
sky independently. But this is quite wrong. One reason for technological unemployment may be that the unions, in pressing for too rapid a rate of money
wage increase, may be putting an artificial premium on labor-saving devices;
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in other words, they prevent the absorption of the growing population by insisting upon too high a rate of pay for a few. Professor Hicks' "elasticity of
substitution" and distinction between "automatic" and "induced" inventions is
in point here.' Higher pay for a group of skilled workers may be obtained and
caused by technical change, but at the same time the process often creates an
unemployment reserve and shifts its burden to the state.
It is time to summarize the problem of wage groups in particular areas.
The pricing system, or "market," works through the pushes and pulls of differential rewards. If we prematurely eliminate these differentials we may stop
adjustment. And though this may benefit some groups, already established,
it by no means necessarily benefits labor as a whole or the country as a whole.
This conflict of the whole and the part runs through the entire labor problem
and we must return to it again shortly.
But the other point must be remembered. Even when technical change
is allowed to justify higher wages in an industry by greater "productivity," this
does not necessarily mean that from the point of view of the public interest
the process has been desirable. For an artificial premium has been put upon
labor-saving devices and needless technological unemployment may have been
created. Technological unemployment does not just descend from the sky like
a bolt of lightning.
III
In the last section we have seen that even productivity gains may sometimes be the result of processes which, from a social point of view, are not entirely desirable. Nevertheless it remains true that if a society, any society, is to
grow, it must be willing to change. Furthermore, gains which management
succeeds in absorbing by productivity increases need not cause inflation and
are on the whole by far the most socially tolerable result of union wage pressure. As I used to put it in lecturing in Europe, "Be like the American unions.
They ask for more, it is true, but they permit the modernization which justifies the increase. The one thing you can't do, to make sense, is ask for an American rate of wage increases while refusing the shift in technique that makes
the raises possible." Here we find ourselves face to face with fundamental
problems of social order in a growing society.
But why growth? No discussion which aims at real objectivity and comprehensiveness can by-pass this question. There are several points involved here.
First is a simple old-fashioned beefsteak approach. "More" is good because it
is more. The most convincing argument here is the matter of health. Few honest
men would really prefer to be sick rather than have the disturbances of industrialism. You cannot really want to end the industrial revolution and go
"back to the land" unless you are willing to let your appendix burst rather
than resort to modern operating techniques. For modern operating and medical
techniques generally depend upon the machine and would be impossible without it.
But going beyond the beefsteak approach, I would like to suggest a further
dimension to the problem. The gain from the process of technical change, de9
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velopment and discovery is not just the "more" which the process gives but
the process itself! In other words, one of the aims of creativity is not just what
is created but the act of creation. "The nature of man" is many things. But one
of them, for many people, is the creative urge. Indeed one principle which I
developed at the beginning of my professional career and whose significance
seems to me to grow almost uninterruptedly is that the real class struggle is
not between the bourgeois and the proletariat but between those who are by
temperament "stirrer-uppers" and those by temperament "peace and quieters."
Like Mr. Ogden Nash's ideal character who is a "gossiper by day and a gossipee by night," what most of us really want is to be stirrer-uppers ourselves and peace and quieters as far as everybody else is concerned. In other words,
we want the changes that suit or benefit us, but not the changes that benefit
others but disturb us. However, if we are honest, we must know that this is
a nonsense and an immoral attitude. If I want a chance to express my creativity, I must be prepared to give one to the other fellow also. And one form
of creativity is science and invention which has aptly been called the aesthetics
of the West.
One point, however, must be stressed. To believe in creativity is not to
believe in everything that may be created, or all forms of creation. Growth
comes through change, but not all change is growth. Nor is "more" always
gain. "More" may be "ilth" in Ruskin's expressive phrase for economic goods
that are socially bad. It is not in my opinion, for example, a social gain to
devastate fine old cities or public parks to make parking lots as is increasingly
and lamentably being done in Europe, and not only there. We can walk, most
of us.
This is a side issue, however, and merely illustrative. Assuming that standards of value and good taste are applied in some reasonable degree, growth
and creativity seem to me to be good things. I wholly repudiate the bogus
mental health approach which confuses external immobility with internal peace.
Such an approach is a good example of that confusion of peace with its "bastard
substitute anaesthesia" spoken of by Whitehead. A man may be driven just
as "crazy" by frustrating his creative impulses as by overstimulating them. The
urge to achieve is not necessarily "aggression" - else all excellence would be
bad.
Our standard of social order, then, if we wish to have both growth and
creativity, must be not a fixed, unchanging form but an orderly form of change.
And it is just at this point that what may have seemed a somewhat abstract
deviation from the main line of our paper joins up with the evaluation of the
union movement. For unfortunately the union movement, especially as it becomes more mature, contains within itself a strong bias against adjustment,
against modernization, and against rising living standards. Let us see why this
is so. To do the job properly we must return to the "non-economic" aims of
union action.
V
In our preface we said that some of the ideals of union organization were
to avoid unfair discrimination, to give "security," to give "companionship" or
participation. Especially strong has been the ideal of the self-governing work-
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shop, the elimination, as Lord Lindsay of Birker put it, of the "we-they" problem. The more "intellectual" types of unionism tend to shift over from mere
"business" or beefsteak unionism toward the ideal of the secure self-governing,
self-directing work unit in which labor and management are one. There, it is
hoped, there will be no feeling that "we" are being ordered around by "them."
The worker does not feel himself at the mercy of impersonal forces.
Unfortunately this idea is just not workable in growing modem society.
The basic weakness of the union movement considered as an independent or alternative form of social organization is that the parts of an organism, thinking
just as parts, cannot direct the whole. Healthy growth requires some means of
coordination. Either the total of economic activity is to be tied together by
the pushes and pulls of the pricing system - in which case the parts are rendered "insecure" and forced to adapt to imposed external forces; or it must
be tied together by the orders of a planning board - equally imposed and
external. For each individual organism to be secure, self-governing and undisturbed, large units must, first, be split up into small units, and, second, all
change and growth must be stopped.Y As soon as the directorate cease to think
only for their little group and begin to think for the nation, as they must do
if they are to plan, a cleavage of outlook develops between them and the local
group. The parish pump cannot rule the nation and still be the parish pump.
"We" and "they" again appear.
But there are other aspects of the urge for security and the prevention of
"discrimination." Most serious of these is perhaps the promotion problem. The
union confronted with the job of explaining why Bill, rather than Joe, should
be promoted is apt, with its strong equalitarian bias, to take refuge in seniority
or in tightly defined job categories. This creates a heaven for mediocrity plus
another barrier to modernization. Finally, up until now, the one answer which
a man could make who found himself in such a tightly organized, ossified work
group was to transfer somewhere else. But, by means of the closed shop, pensions and other benefits, large parts of which are lost on transfer, the labor
market is more and more being cut up into more or less water-tight sub-markets
between which it is more and more difficult to transfer. In return for an often
vague and tenuous right to "influence" the leadership of the union which "represents" him, the worker is severely crippled in the exercise of the much more
practical and immediate right of switching jobs.
The effect of all these tendencies, which I have only sketched in, is to
create in the union movement a great and growing bias against modernization.
There is no necessary deliberate intention involved here. The trouble is that
some of the basic aims and standards of the union movement are fundamentally opposed to rising living standards for the poor, since those rising living standards involve change. And when a society allows its juridical institutions to become geared to a given state of technique - which practically always happens
with a mature union - modernization becomes almost impossible, even by
union leaders.
Often, when I was living in England, labor leaders would come back
10
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from the United States or Germany preaching the gospel of modernization.
"We must improve technology or fail," they would say. Then they would go
back to the industrial districts and try to put across some changes. Almost invariably the outcry from the various vested working interests - the men whose
jobs and solidarity were affected - would become so great that the union
leaders, finding basic "solidarity" affected, would relapse into what one American has called "innocuous desuetude."
VI
We are now in a position to see what can happen with a labor movement that has become too strong. It can cause unemployment or inflation, or
unemployment and inflation. It can greatly increase the rate of technological
unemployment, and it can, on the other hand, prevent the modernization upon
which the process of growth and real wage increase essentially depends. What
can be done about it?
In my next paper I will discuss certain measures for the control of strikes."
But I believe that beyond and behind any specific measures there lies one basic
task - that of taking the halo off the unions. Unions today derive most of
their strength from the public image of them as battlers for the underprivileged
and agents for the public welfare. This image is a tremendous distortion. What
we do not realize is that one work group can exploit another work group just
as much as one employer could do so. It comes hard to a union leader who
sees his union making gains - who sees the playgrounds and the pensions and
the other concessions he has won - to be told that he is just a lobbyist - not
much more altruistic than any other. Hasn't he helped the workers? But, we
must ask, which workers? The good things which his group may have obtained
may well be derived not nearly so much from the employing corporation as
from the inflationary exploitation (however unconscious) of the remainder of
the economy. If you answer, "this problem will be met by organizing everyone," the reply must be made that were everyone maturely organized the chances
are that there would be no further social growth at all.
America today faces one of its great historic periods, one of its most searching challenges. For the first time in decades we find ourselves meeting the competition of countries which have both lower wages and higher technical skill
than we do. There are those who for one reason and another would urge us to
lock ourselves up in our own fat, to try to bribe others to keep out of our
markets, to bury our heads in the sand. "Release from the thralldom of productive efficiency," says Professor Galbraith; "down with foreign competition,"
say others; "security forever," says a third group. These are the voices of decadence and decline. The only constructive response to our position today is
(1) increased efficiency, (2) common sense and moderation in demands for
more, (3) accepting our role as a great international power - and I don't
just mean aid, but trade. Yet in this policy where will the unions stand? Greedy,
provincial, reactionary, lethargic - or willing to move on into the new world
of science, with its danger, but also its glowing promise?
11 Wright, The Canadian Compulsory Conciliation Laws and the General Problem of
Union Power, 35 No=n DAME LAw. 648 (1960).

